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1. Introduction 
Prior to the reform process that started in 1978, the Chinese economy was dominated 
by the agricultural sector. The Chinese economy of today is dominated by an urban-export 
oriented sector. This transformation resulted in significant migration from rural to urban areas. 
The number of migrant workers in China is estimated to be in excess of 140 million. 
Approximately 17.8% of the Chinese population used to live in urban areas in 1978 but this 
proportion increased to 43% in 2005.1 Migrant workers have contributed to a significant 
increase in labour supply in China. However, recent figures suggest that labour supply 
reached its peak in 2010 (Yao and Zhong, 2013). Massive foreign investment and a 
significant increase in the minimum wage over the past two decades have contributed to 
increase in labour cost in China. Knight, Deng and Li (2011) suggest that in 2009 alone there 
was an increase in the real wages of migrant workers by 17.3%. 
Rising prosperity has also coincided with rising income inequality in China. A 
number of studies have examined various types of income inequalities – e.g., regional income 
inequality, urban-rural income inequality, skilled-unskilled wage inequality, etc.2 In order to 
address the issue of rising regional inequality, the Chinese government is constantly 
encouraging foreign firms to invest in the Western provinces. This policy seems to be 
working and companies like Intel, Hewlett-Packard and Pfizer have shown some interest in 
taking advantage of relatively more favourable economic conditions in these areas.3 The 
Chinese government has also raised the minimum wage. Because the cost of living varies 
1 The share of the agricultural sector in GDP and the share of agricultural sector employment as a proportion of 
total employment have significantly declined (Lee, 2009). Recent years have also witnessed the rapid expansion 
of the private sector in China (which includes both domestic and foreign firms) at the expense of state owned 
firms. 
 
2 See Anwar and Sun (2012) and references therein. 
 
3 An interesting discussion of the related issues can be found in Lu, et al. (2010) and Wright and Sahni and 
Zamora (2011). 
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from region to region, the minimum wage is not the same everywhere. The minimum wage is 
highest in Shanghai and the lowest in Ningxia (Xu, 2010).4 Trade unions can play an 
important role in addressing the issue of rising income inequality. This paper focuses on the 
link between unionisation in Chinese firms and firm performance. 
There has been a significant increase in unionisation in Chinese firms from 2007. At 
the grassroots level, the number of trade unions is well in excess of 1.8 million; managed by 
more than 400,000 full-time and a similar number of part-time union officials (Yao and 
Zhong, 2013). Unionisation has affected both domestic and foreign invested firms in China. 
In recent years, there has been a sharp increase in legal action arising from labour disputes. 
Labour disputes related law suits increased from 45,172 in 2001 to 225,061 in 2008 (Yuan, 
Jianqi and Wong, 2011). Like all aspects of the society, unions in China are controlled by the 
Communist Part of China (CPC). With a rapid increase in the number of labour disputes, the 
unions are finding it hard always to side with the CPC and the employers. The aim of 
government and the CPC is to minimise and, if possible, totally eliminate disruption to 
production schedules that could adversely affect China’s reputation as a reliable supplier to 
its international clients.5 
Since the beginning of the current era of reform and openness in China that started 
from the late 1970s, labour unions in China have also gone through some changes. In 1992, 
the Chinese government introduced its new Trade Union Law that defines the nature and 
functions of the Chinese trade unions. This law highlights the need for union to take a more 
4 More recent figures on the minimum wage in China can be found in China Briefing (2012). 
 
5 Several incidences of labour exploitation in China’s export sector have been reported in the media. Notable 
recent labour disputes include a strike at the Honda plant in 2010 and worker suicides at Foxconn, which is a 
very large OEM electronics producer (Cunningham and Wasserstrom, 2011). Other studies, such as Nagi (2005), 
Sum and Nagi (2005) and Chan and Siu (2010) suggest that some domestic firms have been involved in worker 
exploitation which can take the form of forced overtime. In some cases, Chinese firms have used a voluntary 
code of conduct to control the workers.   
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active role in protecting workers interests. Additional rights were granted to labour unions in 
1994. The rapid inflow of foreign investment in China coincided with labour shortages and a 
sharp rise in labour disputes. In an attempt to maintain harmony in the Chinese society, the 
government granted additional rights to trade unions. The unions play a major role in dispute 
resolution (Chan, 2010).6 
Based on their research that mainly covers China’s Hainan province in 2004 and 2005, 
Metcalf and Li (2005) believe that unions are viewed as irrelevant by many workers. They 
argue that there is a need for effective representation in unions. Collective bargaining which 
aims to maximise the income of union members does not take place in China.7 Yuan, Jianqi 
and Wong (2011) argue that trade unions do not affect industrial labour income in China. 
They suggest that inactive trade unions in fact have contributed to a rise in income inequality. 
They believe that only independent trade unions can have a significant impact on labour 
income in China. On the other hand, the empirical work of Yao and Zhong (2008 and 2013) 
suggests that unionisation has resulted in an increase in the hourly wage and pension 
coverage in China. This study concludes that unionisation has resulted in welfare 
improvement. Yao and Zhong’s work is based on cross-sectional data collected from 1268 
firms in 12 cities. They argue that despite government control, unions in China are effective. 
Their empirical results suggest that unionisation has resulted in a decrease in workplace 
accidents and an increase in unemployment insurance. 
Due to unavailability of data, few studies have considered the impact of unionisation 
in China. These studies produced mixed results. Lu, et al. (2010) used a sample of 3,837 
private firms in 2006. They found that the relationship between wages and unionisation was 
not significant. However, unionisation has resulted in an increase in worker benefits. Both 
6 For an interesting discussion of the transformation of Chinese labour relations, see Kai and Brown (2013). 
 
7 See Wang, et al. (2009) for an interesting analysis of the movement towards collective bargaining in China.  
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Yao and Zhong (2008) and Yao and Zhong (2013) use Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
(SUR). However, the former study also acknowledges the possibility of two-way causality 
between wages and unionisation. In order to reduce the potential bias, Yao and Zhong (2008) 
used instrumental variables 3SLS estimation. Yao and Zhong (2008 & 2013) found the 
impact of unionisation on wages and working hours to be statistically significant. 
Unionisation has reduced working hours and wages are higher. However, as indicated earlier, 
the empirical evidence provided by Yuan, Jianqi and Wong (2011) suggests that unionisation 
has not made a significant contribution to labour income. In a very interesting study, Ge 
(2013) considers the impact of unionisation on employee benefits and firm performance. This 
study which is based on data collected in 2004 suggests that unionisation has resulted in an 
improvement in worker wages and benefits. For example the impact of unionisation on 
worker training was found to be positive. However, this study does not appear to have taken 
the endogeneity problem into account. 
While the earlier studies are mainly based on aggregate data, this paper considers the 
impact of unionisation on three major manufacturing industries; (i) textile, (ii) general 
equipment manufacturing and (iii) communication, computer and other electronic equipment 
manufacturing. Due to unavailability of more recent data from published sources, the 
empirical results presented in this paper are based on data collected in 2004. Almost all 
available studies that deal with the impact of unionisation in China are based on cross-
sectional data. Among other things, studies based on cross-section data may be affected by 
that fact that some industries are better unionised as compared to others. In order to overcome 
this problem, we examine the impact of unionisation on firm performance within industry 
groups. As foreign invested firms were slow to embrace unionisation, we consider the link 
between firm performance and unionisation within each of the three industries in aggregate as 
well as separately for domestic and foreign invested firms. Firm productivity, sales, 
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profitability and average wage are used as indicators of firm performance. Workers are 
mainly interested in wages whereas, from the point of view of firms, labour productivity, 
sales and profitability are likely to be the main issues of concern. By examining the impact of 
unionisation on productivity, sales, profitability and average wage, we may be able to assess 
the extent to which unions in China are able to work in the best interests of (i) workers and (ii) 
employers.  
In addition, in order to account for the possible endogeneity problem, this paper 
utilises a Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) technique that allows one to investigate the 
impact of unionisation on firm performance. This technique involves construction of a 
comparison group (see Iacus, et al., 2011a & 2011b). The idea is to find a non-unionised twin 
of a unionised firm. The difference between the performance of a firm and its twin can then 
be attributed to unionisation. Unionisation can be endogenous as big firms tend to be 
unionised. However, the CEM technique, which allows one to calculate the difference 
between a unionised firm and its non-unionised twin, tends to eliminate the possible bias due 
to this endogeneity. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 contains a brief discussion of 
the nature of unionisation in China. The empirical methods are explained in section 3. Section 
4 contains a discussion of the empirical results whereas section 5 contains some concluding 
remarks.    
2. Labour Unions in China 
The All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) is the only government 
approved trade union in China. It was established in 1925 and socialist control of China in 
1949 led to restructuring of the union. In reality, the communist party of China uses ACFTU 
to control workers. The economic reforms of 1978 led to the use of surplus labour from the 
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agriculture sector to China’s growing industrial sector. These reforms also signalled the end 
of lifelong employment (Athreya, 2004 and Liu, 2010). Labour market first emerged in the 
agricultural sector and then expanded to cover the fast growing industrial sector.8 
China’s trade union law as amended in 2001 requires all firms (domestic and foreign 
invested) having 25 or more employees to form a union. Up until a few years ago, some 
foreign invested firms did not comply with this requirement. For example Foxconn 
Technology group (a Taiwan based firm) unionised only after bad publicity concerning long 
shifts without a break. Unionisation was initially resisted by foreign invested firms and 
unions in these firms were relatively weak. However, in recent years, foreign firms such as 
Walmart have allowed unions (Shen and Yao, 2009).  The formation of ACFTU recognised 
unions in foreign invested firms can help foreign firms in China to establish a good rapport 
with the central government. 
While the private sector in China is growing fast and ACFTU has become a bit more 
independent, its links with the communist party remain strong. With the increase in the 
frequency of industrial disputes in China, ACFTU is facing additional pressure to side with 
the workers (Traub-Merz, 2011). However, due to strict government control, trade unions in 
China are not always able to work in the best interests of the workers. Unions in China tend 
to pay more attention to relatively minor disputes. These disputes usually revolve around 
individual grievances and family or personal issues. In other words, unions play an important 
role in settling disputes between firms and individual workers. However, dissatisfaction with 
trade unions in China appears to be growing.9 Lee (209) argues that union intervention has 
resulted in better social security and less intra-firm wage inequality. However, when it comes 
8 For an interesting analysis of the challenges faced by workers in China’s labour market, see Dong and Xu 
(2008) and Friedman and Lee (2010). 
 
9 Nicholas and Zhao (2010) highlighted the extent of dissatisfaction with unions in China. Their work is based 
on interviews conducted in three SOEs in Hubei Province’s auto industry. 
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to big issues that could affect company profits or production, unions almost always accept the 
government line. Given the Chinese government’s pre-occupation with meeting export 
targets and schedules, ACFTU rarely authorises worker strikes (Gross, 2009). 
Trade union officials in China are career civil servants. These officials are trained by 
the government in different areas including administration and politics. Union officials can be 
transferred to the Chinese Communist Party or related positions.10 A survey of more than 500 
union heads in 2007 found that approximately 50% of the union heads also held, at the same 
time, important posts in the CPC (Qiao, 2007). Unions are financed by taxes and company 
profit. Member contributions account for 0.5% of gross wages and companies with unions 
pay 2% of their payroll cost as union levy. The revenue collected by ACFTU is distributed to 
various groups of unions operating under its umbrella. In other words, union officials are 
effectively controlled by the government and the unions do not have significant autonomy 
(Traub-Merz, 2011). It is further argued that the unions in China are based on socialist 
principles whereas the labour market is not and hence unions are not as effective as they 
might be.  
While the trade union laws in China have been amended several times, the improved 
version of the laws does not recognise a basic freedom – workers’ right to strike. The 
ACFTU is attempting to protect workers’ legal rights but asking for the right to strike is not 
on its agenda. Coordinated bargaining with Chinese characteristics does not involve the right 
to strike. Unlike unions in Western countries, unions in China do not take an active role in 
collective bargaining. The cross-sectional study of Yao and Zhong (2009) found that unions 
that were elected by union members were more effective in achieving a positive outcome 
such as an increase in wages. 7  
10 The dual role played by labour unions in China is also highlighted by Chan et al. (2006). 
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3. Methodology 
We employ a matching technique to investigate the impact of labour unions on firm 
performance. An indicator variable { }1,0∈itdunion  is used to capture the extent of 
unionisation. The indicator variable takes a value of 1 if a firm is unionised; zero otherwise. 
The impact of unionisation on firm performance is defined as follows: 
                                                                
1 0
it it itp pρ = −     (1) 
where 1itp  and
0
itp respectively are the performances of a unionised and non-unionised firm. 
 Equation (1) measures the difference between the performance of a unionised and 
non-unionised firms in terms of labour productivity, sales, profitability and average wage. At 
one point in time, a firm can only be either unionised or non-unionised and hence in real life 
we can only observe either 1itp  or
0
itp . Accordingly, equation (1) is not identified. Following 
the existing literature, (see for example Roy 1951, Rubin 1974, Heckman et al. 1997, Dehejia 
and Wahba 2002), we estimate the average impact of unionisation on firm performance as 
follows: 
            
{ } { } { }011 0101 =−===− ititititititit dunionpEdunionpEdunionppE  (2) 
where the unobserved { }10 =itit dunionpE  is estimated by { }00 =itit dunionpE . 
For Equation (2) to be valid, we need to construct an appropriate counterfactual 
comparison group to control for possible self-selection bias which arises from factors that 
affect both union formation and firm performance. 
Iacus et al. (2011a, 2011b) propose a coarsened exact matching (CEM) technique, 
which can be used to construct an appropriate comparison group. Assuming that, conditional 
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on observable factors, the outcome (firm performance) is independent of the treatment 
(formation of a labour union), namely the uncounfoundedness assumption, the CEM 
algorithm first coarsens the observable factors.11 The observable factors are then grouped into 
categories. The factors in each category take substantively indistinguishable values. Using 
these categories, CEM stratifies the data and at each stratum, treated firms (i.e., unionised 
firms) are matched to non-treated firms (i.e., non-unionised firms) to create an appropriate 
comparison group. 
For the comparison group to be valid, its distributions of the factors have to be similar 
to those of treated groups (i.e., the unionised firms). To check whether a comparison group 
(i.e., the imbalance between treated and comparison groups) is valid, Iacus et al.(2011b) 
propose a typeL −1  distance measure, as follows: 
                                         
( ) ∑ −=
k
kk
ll
llll gfgfL


1
11
,1     (3) 
where f and g respectively represent the relative frequency of treated and control units that 
are obtained by discretising and cross-tabulating the factors used in the coarsening; kll 1  
are the number of bins used in the discretization or levels of categorical factors. 1L varies in 
the range 0-1, where a value of 1 indicates complete imbalance and zero complete balance.  
 
With an appropriate comparison group in hand, regression analysis can be used to 
estimate the treatment effect, namely the difference in firm performance that is due to 
unionisation. In summary, CEM works with some observed covariates, attempts to find 
11 The assumption of unconfoundedness allows one to appropriately interpret the difference between treated and 
non-treated groups. This involves adjusting for differences in a fixed set of covariates that removes biases in 
comparisons between treated and non-treated control groups (Rubin, 1990 and Imbes and Wooldridge, 2007). 
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common support and performs a particular kind of matching.12 It is relatively quick as it 
drops strata when exact matches cannot be found in the blurred strata it creates. And matches 
(and distance) are judged by L1 (as a way to go from a multidimensional space to a single 
distance measure). Like any statistical technique, CEM has its own weaknesses but this 
technique solves the problem of endogeneity. 
In this paper we use four indicators of firm performance; labour productivity, sales, 
profitability and average wage. Wage is an important issue from the point of view of workers. 
Labour productivity is closely linked with wages. Wages are also closely linked with firm 
sales and profitability but, from the point of view of firms, sales and profitability are very 
important. As union officials in China are paid from a levy on firm profits, it would be 
interesting to examine the extent to which unions in China are also able to look after the 
interests of firms. The impact of unionisation on each of these factors can be empirically 
evaluated by means of equations (4) to (7) as follows: 
18765
43210)ln(
udunionwhetherfdimiddlewestern
ownershipkagefirmsizelp
++++
+++++=
αααα
ααααα
   (4) 
28765
43210)ln(
udunionwhetherfdimiddlewestern
ownershipkagefirmsizesales
++++
+++++=
ββββ
βββββ
   (5) 
38765
43210
udunionwhetherfdimiddlewestern
ownershipkagefirmsizeityprofitabil
++++
+++++=
γγγγ
γγγγγ
  (6) 
48765
43210
udunionwhetherfdimiddlewestern
ownershipkagefirmsizeeaveragewag
++++
+++++=
λλλλ
λλλλλ
  (7) 
where lp is labour productivity, namely the value added per worker in 2005 prices; sales 
denotes firm sales in 2005 prices;  profitability is the ratio of total profits to sales; 
12 Unlike OLS, CEM is nonparametric and can work well when support is a problem. 
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averagewage is firm average wage which equals total salary divided by the number of 
employees; firmsize is firm size which is measured by the number of employees; k is capital 
intensity which is measured by fixed assets per employee; ownership is a dummy variable 
that takes a value of 1 if a firm is privately owned; western and middle are two dummy 
variables that take a value of 1 if a firm is located respectively in Western and Central China; 
whertherfdi is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firms is FDI invested and 0 
otherwise; dunion is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm is unionised, 0 
otherwise; and u1, u2, u3, and u4 are the usual error terms. 
As the error terms may be correlated across the four equations, we estimate (4) to (7) 
by means of Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) technique. The estimated coefficient of 
dunion is the main variable of interest with its coefficient measuring the impact of 
unionisation on firm performance. The other variables included in equations (4) to (7) are 
control variables that account for the remaining imbalance between treated and control 
groups. The dependent variables in equations (4) to (7) are the imbalance. 
3.1 Data 
The empirical analysis presented in this paper is based on firm level data collected 
from the 2004 enterprise survey conducted by China National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). 
This survey covers a large number of firms, accounting for over 85 per cent of China’s 
industrial output. In this paper, we explore the impact of unionisation within three two-digit 
industries; (i) textile industry, (ii) general equipment manufacturing industry and (iii) 
communication equipment, computer and other electronic equipment manufacturing industry. 
These industries account for a significant proportion of China’s manufacturing output. The 
survey conducted by NBS in 2004 is the most comprehensive. All the data used in this paper 
are not available for other years and hence we have no choice but to use 2004 data. As 
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indicated earlier, other available studies that examine the impact of unionisation in China are 
also based on cross-section data.  
Tables 1, 2, and 3 present the summary statistics of the three industries. These tables 
highlight a few interesting features. First, the sample size is very large. The sample used 
covers 18,300 firms in the textile industry, while the number of firms respectively in general 
equipment manufacturing industry and communication equipment, computer and other 
electronic equipment manufacturing industries is 16,598 and 6,519. Second, the data set 
exhibits substantial variation in all three industries. For example in the general equipment 
manufacturing industry, the mean of labour productivity is 5.0727, while its standard 
deviation is 0.8291. Third, less than 50 per cent of the firms in all three industries are 
unionised. 
<insert Tables 1-3 here> 
4. Results 
We utilize a package developed by Blackwell et al. (2008) to implement the CEM. 
The coarsening is carried out over region, firm size, age, capital intensity, ownership 
structure, and whether FDI invested. For the textile industry, the CEM procedure created 175 
strata. Out of these 175 strata, 62 are matched and 7,586 firms that are unionised are matched 
to 10,486 non-unionised firms. For the general equipment manufacturing industry, 7,770 
unionised firms are matched to 8,553 non-unionised firms, with 195 strata created and 61 
strata matched. In the case of communication equipment, computer and other electronic 
equipment manufacturing industry, the CEM procedure generated 99 strata and 2,562 
unionised firms were matched to 3,829 non-unionised firms within 39 matched strata. 
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Table 4 presents the imbalance before and after the CEM matching. Comparing the 
imbalance before matching with that of post-matching, we observe that the imbalance is 
reduced significantly as the overall L1 measure in all three industries decreased by more than 
50 per cent. In addition, in all there industries, L1 for individual factors also dropped 
significantly after the matching. For example, L1 of firm size in the general equipment 
manufacturing industry decreased from 0.27 to 0.12.13 It can therefore be argued that the 
CEM procedure has resulted in a valid comparison group.  
<insert Table 4 here> 
With the valid control group, we used the seemingly unrelated regression technique to 
estimate the impact of unionisation on firm performance. In other words, equations (4) to (7) 
are estimated by means of SUR. The estimated results are reported in Tables 5-12. 
4.1 The impact of unionisation – the case of textile industry 
The estimated coefficient of dunion, which takes a value of 1 if a firm is unionised, is 
the variable of interest. The estimated results presented in Table 5 indicate that, as compared 
to non-unionised firms, the productivity of unionised firms in textile industry is on average 
0.0261 per cent lower. However, the sales of unionised firms in the same industry are 0.0229 
per cent higher. The estimated coefficient of the variable dunion in profitability equation in 
Table 5 is statistically insignificant. Accordingly, one can argue that there is no difference in 
profitability across unionised and non-unionised firms within China’s textile industry. 
However, on average, the unionised firms pay 0.0141% higher wages. 
<insert Table 5 here> 
13 These differences are standardised. 
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Table 5 shows that firm size has a negative effect on productivity and average wage 
but its effect on firm sales is positive and significant. Larger firms are expected to have 
higher sales but the impact of firm size in the case of textile industry profitability appears to 
be statistically insignificant. Higher capital intensity has positive and statistically significant 
effect on all indicators of firm performance. Older firms in the textile industry are less 
productive and less profitable which appears to suggest that these firms are perhaps relatively 
less modernised. However, older firms experience higher sales and pay higher average wage. 
FDI invested firms pay higher wages and these firms are also more profitable. Table 14 
contains the estimated results when all control variables are excluded from the model. The 
top section of Table 14 shows that, except for the average wage equation, in qualitative terms 
there is little change in the estimated results. The estimated coefficient in the average wage 
equation when all control variables have been excluded is statistically insignificant which 
appears to suggest that the bias arising from the exclusion of control variables is significant. 
In overall terms, majority of the results presented in this paper appear to be robust. 
<insert Tables 6 & 7 here> 
The existing literature suggests that foreign invested firms were slow to unionise and 
hence equations (4) to (7) are re-estimated after splitting the sample into domestic and foreign 
invested firms. Tables (6) and (7) respectively show the estimated results of SUR for 
domestic and foreign invested firms within the textile industry. It is interesting to note that 
performance of unionised and non-unionised firms in textile industry varies significantly 
across the domestic and foreign invested firms. Specifically, the productivity of unionised 
domestic firms is on average 0.0306% lower than the productivity of non-unionised domestic 
firms. However, as compared to domestic firms, the size of the unionised-non-unionised 
productivity gap in China’s foreign invested firms in textile industry as shown in Table 7 is 
statistically insignificant. The sales of unionised firms in both foreign invested and domestic 
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firms in textile industry are higher as compared to the sales of non-unionised firms. However, 
the unionised-non-unionised firm sales gap is relatively higher in domestic firms. Table 6 
shows that, on average, profitability in unionised domestic firms is 0.0014% lower than non-
unionised domestic firms. However, the unionised domestic firms pay higher wages.14 The 
relationship between profitability and unionisation in domestic firms is negative but 
statistically significant only at the 10% level. On the other hand, the results presented in 
Table 7 suggest that productivity, profitability and average wage do not vary across unionised 
and non-unionised foreign invested firms. In summary, as far as the impact of unionisation on 
profitability and average wage in textile industry is concerned, Tables 6 and 7 highlight an 
interesting contrast across domestic and foreign invested firms. In addition, the impact of age 
on indicators of firm performance varies across domestic and foreign invested firms.   
4.2 The impact of unionisation – the case of the general equipment manufacturing industry 
 The estimated results reported in Table 8 reveal that, within China’s general 
equipment manufacturing industry, the productivity and profitability of unionised firms is 
lower. However, as compared to non-unionised firms, sales and average wage in unionised 
firms are higher. Table 9 shows that these results are also valid for domestic firms. However, 
Table 10 shows that, within the foreign invested firms in general equipment manufacturing, 
unionisation has no effect on productivity, profitability and average wage but sales of 
unionised firms are on average 0.0265% higher. These results reveal interesting variations 
cross unionised and non-unionised domestic and foreign invested firms across industries. It is 
generally believed that as compared to domestic firms, foreign invested firms pay higher 
wages. 
<insert Table 8 here> 
14 Ge (2013) found the impact of unionisation on firm profitability to be negative. However, Ge’s work is based 
on aggregate data. 
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 As far as the impact of control variables on firm performance is concerned, higher 
capital intensity positively affects all indicators of firm performance in aggregate as well as 
across domestic and foreign firms which is not surprising. Firm age has a negative effect on 
average wage in domestic firms but its impact on average wage in foreign invested firms is 
positive. This could be attributed to a differential impact on firm sales. Firm size has no effect 
on average wage in domestic firms but it reduces average wage in foreign invested firms. 
<insert Tables 9 & 10 here> 
Table 14 contains the estimated results when all control variables are excluded from 
the model. The middle section of Table 14 shows that in qualitative terms, as compared to the 
results reported in Table 8, there is no change in the estimated results. It can therefore be 
argued that the estimated results are robust.  
4.3 The impact of unionisation – the case of communication, computer and other electronic 
equipment manufacturing industry 
The estimated results reported in Table 11 reveal that, within China’s communication 
equipment, computer and other electronic equipment manufacturing industry, unionisation 
has no effect on firm productivity. However, sales, profitability and average wage, 
respectively, in unionised firms, are on average 0.0257%, 0.0045% and 0.0794% higher. The 
impact on profitability is significant only at the 10% level and very small. Table 11 shows 
that, as expected, capital intensity has a positive and highly significant impact on all 
indicators of firm performance. However, older firms appear to be doing badly in the areas of 
productivity, profitability and sales. Large firms have higher sales and these firms are also 
more productive but their profitability is declining. The bottom panel of Table 14 shows that 
once we exclude all control variables except for the impact on productivity, all other results 
continue to hold.  
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<insert Table 11 here> 
Tables 12 and 13 reveal that both domestic and foreign invested unionised firms pay 
higher wages and their sales are also higher. Based on the size of the impact on average wage, 
it can be argued that unions are more effective in domestic firm. Unionised domestic firms 
are more profitable but less productive. Table 13 shows that unionised foreign invested firms 
are more productive but in terms of profitability there is no difference between the unionised 
and non-unionised foreign invested firms. The impact of capital intensity on all indicators of 
firm performance is positive and significant in the case of both domestic and foreign invested 
firms. Large domestic firms are less productive but their sales are higher. On the other hand, 
large foreign invested firms are more productive but less profitable. 
<insert Tables 12, 13 & 14 here> 
The empirical results presented in this paper reveal that the impact of unionisation on 
firm performance in China is heterogeneous. The heterogeneity has several dimensions – the 
impact of unionisation varies across industries as well as across domestic and foreign 
invested firms. In general, it seems that unionisation has a negative impact on labour 
productivity and a positive impact on average wage. Out of the three industries considered, 
unionisation has the smallest positive impact on average wage in textile industry. Unions are 
relatively more effective in domestic firms. While the impact of unionisation on average 
wage varies across domestic and foreign invested firms, the impact on sales in positive across 
both domestic and foreign invested firms.  
<insert Tables 12, 13 & 14 here> 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
The economic reform process that started in the late 1970s has transformed China 
from agrarian to an urban-based industrialised economy. This transformation led to a rapid 
rise in wages in the urban areas which resulted in significant labour migration from rural to 
urban areas. Rising prosperity and a recent decline in rural to urban migration has resulted in 
a situation where labour cost in China has sharply risen, giving China the third highest wages 
amongst emerging Asian nations. A very large number of firms in China are unionised. 
However, unions in China do not play their traditional role. While unions in China play an 
important role in resolving worker-employer disputes, they are not involved in collective 
bargaining. In fact, unions officials in China are paid from a levy imposed on firm profits. In 
addition, a number of union officials concurrently hold positions in the Communist Party of 
China. Unions in China are practically under government control. 
This paper examines the impact of unionisation on firm performance in China’s (i) 
textile industry, (ii) general equipment manufacturing industry and (iii) communication 
equipment, computer equipment and other equipment manufacturing industry. We focus on 
four indicators of firm performance; labour productivity, sales, profitability and average wage. 
As the unions in China do not play their traditional role, it would be useful to examine the 
impact of unionisation on both workers and employer’s interests. Workers are of course 
interested in wages whereas the management is more concerned about sales, profitability and 
labour productivity. It is well-known that self selection can lead to significant bias when the 
unionised-non-unionised firm performance gap is calculated. In order to avoid this bias, we 
use the Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) technique which involves finding a unionised firm 
and its non-unionised twin. One can then calculate the unionised-non-unionised firm 
performance gap. We use Seemingly Unrelated Regression to examine the impact of 
unionisation on the performance gap. The empirical analysis presented in this paper is based 
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on data collected from a national survey conducted by China’s National Bureau of Statistics 
in 2004. This survey contains all the data that we need. Obviously, it would have been 
preferable if panel data were available, but it is perhaps worth mentioning that only a handful 
of studies have examined the impact of unionisation on wages and worker welfare in China 
and these studies also used cross-section data. However, this paper utilises a different 
methodology and focuses on three industries within China’s manufacturing sector.  
The empirical results presented in this paper reveal interesting variations across 
sectors and also across domestic and foreign invested firms. In the case of the textile industry, 
we find that on average workers in unionised domestic firms are less productive and firm 
profitability as compared to non-unionised firms is also lower. The sales of unionised 
domestic textile firms are higher. On average, unionised firms pay higher wages but further 
investigation revealed that the positive impact on average wage in textile industry is restricted 
to workers in domestic firms; unionisation has not affected average wage in foreign invested 
textile firms. However, unionisation in the textile industry appears to have helped the 
employers and perhaps the union officials; the sales of both domestic and foreign invested 
unionised firms are higher. 
In the case of the general equipment manufacturing industry, our empirical results 
suggest that unionised domestic firms pay higher average wages but the average wage gap 
between unionised and non-unionised foreign invested firms is statistically insignificant. 
Sales of both unionised domestic and unionised foreign invested firms are higher. Labour 
productivity in unionised domestic firms is lower and the same applies to firm profitability. 
The difference between the productivity and profitability of unionised and non-unionised 
foreign invested firms in general equipment manufacturing industry is statistically 
insignificant. 
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In the case of the communication equipment, computer equipment and other 
equipment manufacturing industry, we found that both unionised domestic and unionised 
foreign invested firms pay higher wages. While the sales of both unionised domestic and 
unionised foreign invested firms are higher, workers in unionised foreign invested firms are 
more productive but the opposite is true in the case of unionised domestic firms. Unionisation 
has not resulted in a change in the profitability of foreign invested firms but it has a positive 
impact on profitability of unionised domestic firms. 
In summary, while unions in China are currently not playing their traditional role, one 
could not claim that they are totally ineffective. Our results suggest that the impact of 
unionisation on average wage varies across industries. In relative terms, the gain to workers 
in domestic textile firms is the smallest and workers in foreign invested textile firms have not 
gained at all. Workers in domestically owned firms in the general equipment manufacturing 
sectors have gained but workers in foreign invested firms have not benefitted from 
unionisation. There is however, one conclusion that appears to hold across all industries and 
all types of unionised firms that have been considered in this paper - unionisation has resulted 
in increases in sales. It seems that while unions are able to exert a positive influence on wages 
in some industries, they are successful in looking after the interests of the employers across 
all industries and all types of firms (domestic as well as foreign invested). 
Finally, as this study is based on cross-section data, it would be useful to examine the 
impact of unionisation on firm performance when panel data becomes available. At this stage, 
due to unavailability of data, we have no choice but to rely on cross-sectional data. Lack of 
data also dictated our choice of control variables, which has implications for the identification 
strategy. 
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 Table 1: Summary Statistics of Textile Industry 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ln(labour 
productivity) 18287 5.0622 0.8789 -2.0614 9.1298 
ln(sales) 18300 2.2848 0.1046 1.6035 2.8092 
profitability 18300 0.0396 0.0518 0 0.9029 
ln(average wage) 18300 2.3103 0.4328 -2.6707 5.2868 
firm size 18300 0.2304 0.5500 0.0080 28.5860 
age 18300 7.1144 7.2204 1 139 
capital intensity 18300 60.6359 103.0774 0.0036 3780.6920 
ownership 18300 0.8128 
   whether FDI invested 18300 0.1983 
   western 18300 0.0257 
   middle 18300 0.0799 
   dunion 18300 0.4263 
   Note: Unit of firm size is thousand persons; Unit of average wage and capital intensity 
is thousand yuan per person.  
Source: NBS, 2004. 
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 Table 2: Summary Statistics of General Equipment Manufacturing Industry 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ln(labour productivity) 16587 5.0727 0.8291 -1.1787 9.6748 
ln(sales) 16598 2.2683 0.1100 0.2924 2.8095 
profitability 16598 0.0598 0.0750 0 0.9820 
ln(average wage) 16598 2.4649 0.5006 -2.5649 5.6091 
firm size 16598 0.1680 0.3757 0.0080 17.2740 
age 16598 10.0815 10.5865 1 146 
capital intensity 16598 51.2975 86.5309 0.0095 2917.0000 
ownership 16598 0.6647 
   whether FDI invested 16598 0.1406 
   western 16598 0.0480 
   middle 16598 0.1091 
   dunion 16598 0.4834 
   Note: Unit of firm size is thousand persons; Unit of average wage and capital intensity 
is thousand yuan per person.  
Source: NBS, 2004. 
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 Table 3: Summary Statistics of Communication Equipment, Computer and Other 
Electronic Equipment Manufacturing Industry 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ln(labour 
productivity) 6508 5.1560 1.1151 -0.0834 11.7138 
ln(sales) 6519 2.3387 0.1456 1.6614 2.8926 
profitability 6519 0.0753 0.0985 0 0.9929 
ln(average wage) 6519 2.6989 0.6080 -0.3994 6.2948 
firm size 6519 0.4588 1.3763 0.0080 71.9150 
age 6519 7.8578 6.8005 1 69 
capital intensity 6519 74.3723 216.5588 0.0100 11575.9000 
ownership 6519 0.7744 
   whether FDI invested 6519 0.4745 
   western 6519 0.0393 
   middle 6519 0.0436 
   dunion 6519 0.4097 
   Note: Unit of firm size is thousand persons; Unit of average wage and capital intensity 
is thousand yuan per person.  
Source: NBS, 2004. 
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 Table 4: Measurement of Imbalance 
  Textile Industry 
General Equipment 
Manufacturing Industry 
Communication Equipment, 
Computer and Other 
Electronic Equipment 
Manufacturing Industry 
 
L1 mean L1 Mean L1 Mean 
  Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After 
overall L1 0.51 0.22 
  
0.52 0.21 
  
0.45 0.17 
  region 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.00 
firm size 0.23 0.11 0.21 0.10 0.27 0.12 0.14 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.17 0.10 
age 0.22 0.14 3.50 0.77 0.22 0.09 5.74 0.69 0.27 0.07 4.28 0.30 
capital intensity 0.07 0.01 7.25 2.72 0.08 0.02 3.43 2.97 0.10 0.05 13.55 16.85 
ownership 0.10 0.00 -0.10 0.00 0.18 0.00 -0.18 0.00 0.16 0.00 -0.16 0.00 
whether or not FDI 
invested 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.06 0.00 -0.06 0.00 
Note: “Before” and “After” denote the imbalance before and after the CEM matching respectively.  
Source: Authors’ own calculation based on the sample. 
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 Table 5: Estimated Results for Firms in Textile Industry 
  productivity sales profitability average wage 
Regressors Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z 
firmsize -0.3918*** -23.29 0.1517*** 89.20 0.0014 1.31 -0.1001*** -11.73 
age -0.0051*** -6.01 0.0011*** 12.71 -0.0001** -2.26 0.0014*** 3.33 
k 0.0034*** 49.71 0.0002*** 34.00 0.0001*** 11.31 0.0006*** 17.55 
ownership -0.0025 -0.16 -0.0079*** -5.01 -0.0074*** -7.37 0.0412*** 5.21 
whetherfdi -0.0827*** -5.43 0.0303*** 19.70 0.0154*** 15.65 0.1972*** 25.53 
western -0.4343*** -11.49 -0.0116*** -3.04 0.0001 0.03 -0.3472*** -18.1 
middle -0.4001*** -17.80 -0.0136*** -5.98 0.0018 1.26 -0.3612*** -31.67 
dunion -0.0261** -2.15 0.0229*** 18.63 -0.0008 -1.00 0.0141** 2.29 
constant 5.0441*** 283.02 2.2225*** 1234.04 0.0405*** 35.18 2.2417*** 247.86 
No. of obs. 18060  18060  18060  18060  
χ2 3963.73  11869  430.49  3093.78  
R2 0.18   0.4   0.02   0.14   
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level respectively 
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Table 6: Estimated Results for Domestic Firms in Textile Industry 
  productivity sales profitability average wage 
Regressors Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z 
firmsize -0.4268*** -21.58 0.1646*** 81.59 0.0027** 2.16 -0.1255*** -12.51 
age -0.0040*** -4.70 0.0011*** 12.49 0.0000 0.16 0.0010** 2.38 
k 0.0034*** 42.36 0.0002*** 29.65 0.0001*** 10.14 0.0006*** 14.51 
ownership 0.0012 0.08 -0.0062*** -4.03 -0.0064*** -6.86 0.0321*** 4.2 
western -0.4401*** -11.83 -0.0115*** -3.03 0.0003 0.12 -0.3455*** -18.31 
middle -0.4049*** -17.76 -0.0149*** -6.42 0.0032** 2.29 -0.3709*** -32.07 
dunion -0.0306** -2.32 0.0239*** 17.76 -0.0014* -1.76 0.0240*** 3.58 
constant 5.0411*** 279.73 2.2180*** 1207.12 0.0386*** 34.38 2.2538*** 246.54 
No. of obs. 14482 
 
14482 
 
14482 
 
14482 
 Chi2 3156.7 
 
9218.39 
 
179.12 
 
1986.67 
 R2 0.18   0.39   0.01   0.12   
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level respectively 
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 Table 7: Estimated Results for Foreign Invested Firms in Textile Industry 
  productivity sales profitability average wage 
Regressors Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z 
firmsize -0.3217*** -9.54 0.1266*** 38.53 0.0001 0.03 -0.0500*** -2.93 
age -0.0141*** -4.54 0.0011*** 3.58 -0.0013*** -5.97 0.0047*** 2.96 
k 0.0034*** 24.93 0.0002*** 16.30 0.0000*** 5.03 0.0006*** 9.36 
ownership -0.3175* -1.88 -0.0045 -0.27 -0.0114 -0.96 0.3317*** 3.88 
western -0.3073* -1.67 -0.0251 -1.40 -0.0020 -0.15 -0.3680*** -3.96 
middle -0.3451*** -4.42 -0.0097 -1.28 -0.0106* -1.93 -0.2651*** -6.7 
dunion -0.0019 -0.06 0.0169*** 5.83 0.0016 0.76 -0.0161 -1.07 
constant 5.3133*** 30.90 2.2610*** 134.90 0.0692*** 5.73 2.1170*** 24.29 
No. of obs. 3578 
 
3578 
 
3578 
 
3578 
 Chi2 821.93 
 
1839.45 
 
67.06 
 
198.7 
 R2 0.19   0.34   0.02   0.05   
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level respectively 
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 Table 8: Estimated Results for Firms in General Equipment Manufacturing Industry 
  productivity sales profitability average wage 
Regressors Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z 
firmsize -0.4247*** -13.77 0.2948*** 89.38 -0.0094*** -3.27 -0.0479*** -2.66 
age -0.0076*** -13.79 -0.0002*** -2.63 -0.0003*** -6.40 -0.0010*** -3.21 
k 0.0034*** 34.46 0.0003*** 27.55 0.0001*** 13.89 0.0010*** 17.66 
ownership 0.0456*** 3.29 -0.0011 -0.75 -0.0077*** -5.91 -0.0556*** -6.87 
whetherfdi 0.2198*** 11.15 0.0422*** 20.01 0.0328*** 17.77 0.4409*** 38.32 
western -0.2736*** -9.90 -0.0147*** -4.96 -0.0115*** -4.47 -0.1075*** -6.67 
middle -0.2750*** -14.44 -0.0165*** -8.07 -0.0018 -1.02 -0.2519*** -22.66 
dunion -0.1030*** -8.32 0.0163*** 12.34 -0.0029** -2.55 0.0792*** 10.97 
constant 5.0765*** 331.11 2.2007*** 1341.85 0.0608*** 42.46 2.3917*** 267.34 
No. of obs. 16312 
 
16312 
 
16312 
 
16312 
 chi2 2926.9 
 
11886.4 
 
788.94 
 
3230.83 
 R2 0.15   0.42   0.05   0.17   
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level respectively 
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 Table 9: Estimated Results for Domestic Firms in General Equipment Manufacturing Industry 
  productivity sales profitability average wage 
Regressors Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z 
firmsize -0.6174*** -16.42 0.3325*** 82.65 -0.0111*** -3.26 -0.0133 -0.63 
age -0.0070*** -12.54 -0.0003*** -5.55 -0.0003*** -5.79 -0.0015*** -4.89 
k 0.0036*** 28.40 0.0003*** 21.93 0.0002*** 13.94 0.0005*** 7.51 
ownership 0.0350** 2.53 -0.0004 -0.25 -0.0077*** -6.17 -0.0601*** -7.73 
western -0.2882*** -10.15 -0.0151*** -4.97 -0.0128*** -4.98 -0.1236*** -7.75 
middle -0.2826*** -14.56 -0.0178*** -8.59 -0.0023 -1.29 -0.2507*** -23.00 
dunion -0.1129*** -8.51 0.0127*** 8.98 -0.0039*** -3.24 0.0819*** 11.00 
constant 5.0982*** 319.02 2.1987*** 1286.16 0.0599*** 41.47 2.4142*** 269.07 
No. of obs. 14029 
 
14029 
 
14029 
 
14029 
 chi2 2061.2 
 
8559.97 
 
320.86 
 
785.62 
 R2 0.13   0.38   0.02   0.05   
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level respectively 
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Table 10: Estimated Results for Foreign Invested Firms in General Equipment Manufacturing 
Industry 
  productivity sales profitability average wage 
Regressors Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z 
firmsize -0.0535 -0.99 0.2195*** 39.54 -0.0060 -0.99 -0.1179*** -3.15 
age 0.0013 0.32 0.0020*** 4.78 -0.0018*** -3.78 0.0149*** 5.19 
k 0.0030*** 19.73 0.0003*** 16.89 0.0001*** 4.69 0.0016*** 15.33 
ownership 0.5358** 2.41 0.0411* 1.79 0.0287 1.16 0.5411*** 3.50 
western -0.0329 -0.30 -0.0171 -1.50 0.0065 0.53 0.0896 1.17 
middle -0.1003 -1.15 0.0011 0.12 0.0052 0.53 -0.3168*** -5.21 
dunion 0.0002 0.01 0.0265*** 7.53 0.0044 1.16 0.0370 1.56 
constant 4.6281*** 20.53 2.1962*** 94.48 0.0678*** 2.69 2.0919*** 13.35 
No. of obs. 2283 
 
2283 
 
2283 
 
2283 
 chi2 401.74 
 
2113.49 
 
40.69 
 
322.62 
 R2 0.15   0.48   0.02   0.12   
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level respectively 
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Table 11: Estimated Results for Firms in Communication Equipment, Computer and Other 
Electronic Equipment Manufacturing Industry 
  productivity sales profitability average wage 
Regressors Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z 
firmsize 0.0872*** 5.53 0.0919*** 55.44 -0.0053*** -3.78 0.0033 0.38 
age -0.0168*** -8.89 -0.0012*** -6.05 -0.0015*** -9.05 0.0005 0.45 
k 0.0028*** 25.49 0.0002*** 20.68 0.0001*** 7.04 0.0010*** 16.89 
ownership -0.0511 -1.46 -0.0157*** -4.26 -0.0146*** -4.69 -0.1527*** -7.85 
whetherfdi 0.0773** 2.37 0.0682*** 19.85 0.0177*** 6.07 0.2351*** 12.97 
western -0.0856 -1.29 0.0110 1.59 0.0282*** 4.79 -0.0458 -1.25 
middle -0.1922*** -3.23 -0.0103* -1.65 0.0113** 2.14 -0.2177*** -6.58 
dunion 0.0078 0.30 0.0257*** 9.28 0.0045* 1.91 0.0794*** 5.44 
constant 5.0727*** 143.94 2.2608*** 609.76 0.0816*** 26.01 2.6038*** 133.02 
No. of obs. 6380 
 
6380 
 
6380 
 
6380 
 chi2 849.21 
 
5498.11 
 
233.42 
 
639.02 
 R2 0.12   0.46   0.04   0.09   
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level respectively 
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 Table 12: Estimated Results for Domestic Firms in Communication Equipment, Computer and 
Other Electronic Equipment Manufacturing Industry 
  productivity sales profitability average wage 
Regressors Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z 
firmsize -0.1472*** -3.95 0.1466*** 36.16 0.0023 0.66 -0.0109 -0.49 
age -0.0162*** -8.39 -0.0016*** -7.69 -0.0013*** -7.31 -0.0014 -1.22 
k 0.0029*** 15.01 0.0003*** 12.23 0.0001*** 6.07 0.0011*** 9.92 
ownership -0.0715** -2.13 -0.0134*** -3.67 -0.0143*** -4.49 -0.1623*** -8.14 
western -0.1264* -1.90 0.0027 0.37 0.0297*** 4.71 -0.0799** -2.02 
middle -0.1731*** -2.76 -0.0073 -1.08 0.0099* 1.67 -0.2264*** -6.09 
dunion -0.0639* -1.92 0.0249*** 6.88 0.0076** 2.42 0.0897*** 4.55 
constant 5.1551*** 140.63 2.2517*** 564.96 0.0747*** 21.57 2.6236*** 120.75 
No. of obs. 3336 
 
3336 
 
3336 
 
3336 
 chi2 316.42 
 
1780.22 
 
158.16 
 
229.91 
 R2 0.09   0.35   0.05   0.06   
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level respectively 
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Table 13: Estimated Results for Foreign Invested Firms in Communication Equipment, Computer 
and Other Electronic Equipment Manufacturing Industry 
  Productivity Sales Profitability Average Wage 
Regressors Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z 
firmsize 0.1339*** 7.30 0.0808*** 44.23 -0.0064*** -4.10 0.0014 0.15 
age -0.0158*** -3.25 0.0001 0.12 -0.0028*** -6.69 0.0098*** 3.81 
k 0.0028*** 20.27 0.0002*** 16.79 0.0000*** 3.99 0.0010*** 14.07 
ownership 0.1494 0.75 -0.0064 -0.32 0.0361** 2.14 -0.0970 -0.93 
western 0.4454** 2.35 0.0115 0.61 0.0053 0.33 0.1687* 1.70 
middle -0.2314* -1.67 -0.0436*** -3.15 0.0115 0.98 -0.2236*** -3.06 
dunion 0.1329*** 3.20 0.0172*** 4.16 -0.0010 -0.28 0.0647*** 2.96 
constant 4.8559*** 23.90 2.3214*** 114.71 0.0648*** 3.77 2.7097*** 25.37 
No. of obs. 3044 
 
3044 
 
3044 
 
3044 
 chi2 512.94 
 
2352.1 
 
102.04 
 
228.67 
 R2 0.14   0.44   0.03   0.07   
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level respectively 
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Table 14: Estimated Results without Control Variables 
  Productivity Sales Profitability Average Wage 
Regressors Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z 
Textile Industry 
dunion -0.0613*** -4.61 0.0391*** 25.43 -0.0006 -0.78 0.0052 0.79 
constant 5.0712*** 589.44 2.2714*** 2279.54 0.0406*** 79.74 2.3096*** 539.46 
No. of obs. 18060 
 
18060 
 
18060 
 
18060 
 Chi2 21.28 
 
646.59 
 
0.6 
 
0.63 
 R2 0.001 
 
0.03 
 
0 
 
0 
 General Equipment Manufacturing Industry 
dunion -0.1311*** -9.94 0.0377*** 22.36 -0.0036*** -3.07 0.0769*** 9.92 
constant 5.1014*** 560.54 2.2491*** 1931.47 0.0609*** 75.69 2.4115*** 450.56 
No. of obs. 16312 
 
16312 
 
16312 
 
16312 
 Chi2 98.81 
 
499.76 
 
9.44 
 
98.38 
 R2 0.01 
 
0.03 
 
0.001 
 
0.006 
 Communication Equipment, Computer and Other Electronic Equipment Manufacturing Industry 
dunion 0.0568** 2.04 0.0388*** 10.44 0.0051** 2.16 0.0962*** 6.34 
constant 5.1027*** 289.76 2.3184*** 984.20 0.0689*** 45.91 2.6541*** 276.16 
No. of obs. 6380 
 
6380 
 
6380 
 
6380 
 Chi2 4.17 
 
109.03 
 
4.66 
 
40.19 
 R2 0.001   0.02   0.001   0.006   
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level respectively. 
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